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Symposium: The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law 
THE CANON(S) OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 
Mark Tushnet* 
Any discipline has a canon, a set of themes that organize the 
way in which people think about the discipline. Or, perhaps, any 
discipline has a number of competing canons. Is there a canon 
of constitutionallaw?1 A group of casebook authors met in De-
cember 1999 to discuss the choices they had made-what they 
had decided to include, what to exclude, what they regretted ex-
cluding (or including), what principles they used in developing 
their casebooks.2 Most of the authors were affiliated with law 
schools, but some had developed coursebooks for use in under-
graduate political science and constitutional history courses. 
Each participant was asked to write a short paper describing the 
canon of constitutional law, either as reflected in his or her 
choices, or in the range of materials available in the field. 3 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University 
Law Center. I would like to thank the participants in the Georgetown Discussion Group 
on Constitutional Law, some of whose written contributions are included here, and all of 
whose contributions to the discussion are reflected in my introduction. I would also like 
to thank Dean Judith Areen for the support she has given the Discussion Group over the 
past decade. 
1. For a theoretical discussion, see J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons 
of Constitutional lAw, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 963 (1998). 
2. I invited the authors of every casebook on my shelf and authors of as many 
other coursebooks as I became aware of. I also invited a number of political scientists 
and law professors who had not written coursebooks but were coursebook users. 
3. The papers were to be ten to fifteen pages long. As you will see, some authors 
took the page limitation more seriously than others. Some of the participants used pa-
pers that had been published elsewhere, which was not a violation of the rules of partici-
pation, but was a reason for excluding the papers from this collection. See, e.g., Derrick 
Bell, Constitutional Conflicts: The Perils and Rewards of Pioneering in the lAw S,chool 
Classroom, 21 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1039 (1998). 
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What do coursebook authors' reflections on their choices 
show about the canon(s) of constitutional law? In my view, 
three themes pervaded our discussions, and many of the papers 
that follow. A crude classification is that one theme involves the 
focus of the constitutional law canon, another involves the 
canon's substance, and the third involves the audience for consti-
tutional law studies. 4 
Participants expressed substantial interest in teaching some-
thing about the Constitution in non-judicial settings. This interest 
takes several forms. In what seems initially to be the narrowest 
form, the interest lies in ensuring that students know what hap-
pens next. That is, what happens after the Supreme Court de-
cides a constitutional question? Students ought to know, many 
participants thought, that Congress enacted a statute requiring 
the armed forces to allow service members to wear "item[ s] of 
religious apparel" if doing so would not "interfere with the per-
formance of the member's military duties," after the Court held 
that the Constitution did not require such an accommodation.5 
Perhaps more interesting are legislative reactions to decisions 
finding a statute unconstitutional. After United States v. Lopez,6 
for example, Congress re-enacted the Gun Free School Zones 
Act, this time including findings and a jurisdictional element 
making it an offense to possess (near a school) a gun that had 
moved in interstate commerce.7 Instructors could use this stat-
ute to probe the meaning of Lopez: How important is Lopez as 
a case about fundamental principles of federalism if its strictures 
can be overcome by a statute containing findings and a jurisdic-
tional element? 
4. A recent thread in the Conlaw discussion list moderated by Eugene Volokh 
suggests that concern about the audience affects the way in which law professors con-
struct syllabi for their courses and the preferences they have for teaching constitutional 
law in the first or second years of law school. Obviously, those who teach constitutional 
law or history to undergraduates have other concerns, but, as I suggest below, the fact 
that their audience is undergraduates brings their approach close to one supported to 
some extent by those who teach constitutional law in law schools. 
5. See Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 1515-17 (Little, Brown & Co., 
2d ed. 1991). The reference to the statute is omitted from the third edition. See Geof-
frey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 1596-97 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1996). I 
mention this to note the pervasive concern among casebook authors for creating a book 
of manageable length (and the judgment, shared by its co-authors, that the third edition 
of the cited work presses the limits of manageability). 
6. 514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(1994) (findings); id. § 922(q)(2)(defining the offense 
with a jurisdictional element). 
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A broader discussion might be introduced if students knew 
that legislative vetoes versist after Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service v. Chadha. Here instructors might ask why legisla-
tive vetoes persist and thereby open a discussion of the way in 
which political forces might exert a hydraulic effect on legisla-
tion, by which I mean that political forces will seek their own 
level no matter what the Supreme Court says the Constitution 
allows. This discussion, in turn, might be linked to others, such 
as one way of presenting the legislative response to the Court's 
desegregation decisions. Here at least two paths seem open. 
Along one, the class could explore Gerald Rosenberg's argu-
ment about the conditions for successful judicial intervention, 
based on the Constitution, in controversial public policy ques-
tions.9 Along another, it might use these discussions to examine 
Barry Friedman's account of constitutional adjudication as a 
process of dialogue between the Supreme Court and Congress.10 
The Constitution plays another role in non-judicial settings: 
Non-judicial actors sometimes discuss the Constitution in the or-
dinary course of their business. Sometimes, as in the case of im-
peachment, they do so because no one else has authority to do 
so. Sometimes they do so because they believe they have a con-
stitutional duty to consider the constitutionality of legislative 
proposals.11 Many participants believed that students would 
profit from some examination of constitutional interpretation as 
practiced by non-judicial actors and noted the general scarcity of 
materials available to support such an examination. 12 
I believe that such discussions, when supported with appro-
priate materials, would be provocative along several dimensions. 
8. See Louis Fisher and Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 
125-28 (West, 2d ed. 1996). 
9. See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About 
Social Change? 30-36 (U. of Chicago Press, 1991). 
10. See generally Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 
577, 653·71 (1993). 
11. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Inter· 
pretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1997), bite the bullet and conclude that the argument 
for judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation is an argument for judicial exclu-
sivity and that non-judicial actors should not consider the constitutionality of legislative 
proposals. I think it fair to say that most scholars, even those who support judicial su-
premacy, reject the conclusion Alexander and Schauer draw (although my view is that 
their inference is correct given the premise of judicial supremacy, which is a reason for 
rejecting the premise). 
12. But see Fisher and Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law at 1 (cited 
in note 8); Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: 
Cases and Materials 903-1015 (Little, Brown and Co., 2d ed. 1983). 
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How different are legislative or executive discussions of constitu-
tionality from judicial ones, for example? Constitutional schol-
ars generally believe that judges draw on a repertoire of inter-
pretive approaches in justifying their constitutional conclusions, 13 
and (perhaps) that these approaches are organized in a rough hi-
erarchy, with precedent and original understanding having pre-
sumptive priority over other approaches. Do legislators and ex-
ecutive officials use the same interpretive repertoire, and if so, 
do they act as if they accepted the same hierarchy that courts 
do? 
I am confident that sustained inquiry would reveal that leg-
islative and executive officials are more conscious of, and invoke 
somewhat more systematically, obviously political considera-
tions-that is, concerns about how taking one or another consti-
tutional position would affect their political prospects.14 If I am 
right, the examination would also allow us to discuss the pur-
ported differences between judges and other officials more sub-
tly than usually occurs. For, after all, what is perjoratively politi-
cal from one point of view is sensibly prudential from another. 
And prudentialism is part of the judicial repertoire of interpre-
tive approaches.15 But if legislators are (politically) pragmatic 
and judges are Gudicially) pragmatic, the case for a judicial 
power to displace legislative decisions is weakened.16 
Participants also recurrently identified important matters of 
constitutional governance that are not the subject of decided 
cases, some of which, they thought, should be brought into the 
constitutional law course. The political question doctrine bars 
the courts from considering some of these topics, such as im-
peachment. As recent events showed, interpretive questions of 
some significance can arise in connection with these topics. Per-
haps more interesting, though, are constitutional questions that 
are, as Vicki C. Jackson put it, "invisible" because they are 
13. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189 (1987); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate 
(Oxford U. Press, 1982). 
14. Their political prospects are, I believe, themselves affected (though not deter-
mined) by whether the position the politicians take expresses good public policy. 
15. See, e.g., John H. Garvey and T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Modern Constitutional 
Theory: A Reader 193-212 (West, 4th ed. 1999) (presenting sections on pragmatism and 
minimalism ). 
16. Particularly if one can also establish that legislators give prudential judgments a 
higher place in the hierarchy of interpretation than judges do, and that the legislators' 
interpretive hierarchy is more defensible than the judges'. 
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taken-for-granted aspects of our system.17 It is an important as-
pect of U.S. constitutionalism that we have had elections held at 
the regularly scheduled times throughout our history, even in the 
midst of civil war and large-scale international conflicts.18 Per-
haps relatedly, U.S. civilian officials have been able to maintain 
control over the military, a phenomenon that is not universal 
among constitutional states. 
These are clearly important elements in U.S. constitution-
alism. How can they be brought into a course on constitutional 
law? One possibility is to use them (or one or two of them) to 
raise questions about the meaning of law in our courses. Should 
a convention against military intervention in politics be treated 
in the same way that the Incompatibility Clause is?19 This is a 
point at which some reference to comparative constitutional law 
might be useful as well. Constitutional conventions are a much 
more prominent feature of constitutional thinking outside the 
United States than they are here. The constitution of the United 
Kingdom consists solely of conventions.w The Canadian Su-
preme Court has issued substantial opinions dealing with the 
content of constitutional conventions governing the relation be-
tween Canada's provinces and the nation.21 Many teachers of 
17. Professor Jackson's paper is not included in this collection because she plans to 
develop its arguments at even more substantial length elsewhere. 
18. Although the existence of a war, and the prospect of direct U.S. involvement, 
did induce Franklin D. Roosevelt to run for a third term in 1940, contrary to what 
seemed to be a convention against third terms. 
19. The Incompatibility Gause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 6, cl. 2, provides, "no Person 
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during 
his Continuance in Office." It is, I believe, the constitutional text most closely related to 
the question of civilian control of the military. Article II of course makes the president 
the commander in chief of the armed forces but does not preclude the possibility that the 
president would himself or herself be a military officer. See generally U.S. Const., Art. 
II, § 2, c!. 2. 
20. As a matter of stated law, the British parliament could displace any existing 
constitutional convention, including conventions about holding parliamentary elections. 
The political limits on doing so are quite substantial. Notably, as a matter of stated law, 
any existing provision in the U.S. Constitution can be displaced by a constitutional 
amendment. See generally U.S. Const., Art. V. The formal barriers to such amendments 
may be no more substantial than the political barriers to changes in fundamental conven-
tions in the British constitution. (1be provision barring amendments to the equal repre-
sentation of states in the Senate arguably could be changed by successive amendments-
one amending that portion of Article V, and the next one altering the states' representa-
tion in the Senate. My own view is that this could be accomplished in a single step, al-
though most of those who commented on this suggestion on the Conlaw discussion list 
appear to believe that such an amendment would have to be adopted unanimously rather 
than by the lesser supermajorities required by Article V.) 
21. See, e.g., Reference re Secession of Quebec, (1998] 2 Can. S.C.R. 217; Refer-
ence re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, (1981] 1 Can. S.C.R. 753 (Patriation 
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constitutional law present their students with variants of the 
question, "What is the law in constitutional law," intending to 
help students think about the difference (if any) between consti-
tutional law and good public policy. Questions about the legal 
status of constitutional conventions might raise the same point 
from a slightly different direction. 
An important substantive theme in the participants' discus-
sions, reflected in the papers that follow, was the importance of 
membership questions for constitutional law. Taken narrowly, 
membership questions deal with such matters as the position of 
U.S. citizens when they travel from one state to another,22 the 
status of Puerto Rico in the U.S. constitutional system, and the 
constitutional rights of long-term resident aliens lawfully present 
in the United States.23 
These narrow questions open much broader issues, how-
ever. Consider, for example, the role that natural rights (or 
"fundamental rights") theorizing plays in constitutional adjudi-
cation. When one looks to the non-constitutional- that is, 
philosophical-literature on natural rights, one discovers that it 
centers on the rights of human beings as such. On the first level 
of the philosophical discussions, the membership questions deal 
with who (or what) counts as a person entitled to the natural 
rights the philosophers identify.24 
There is, however, a second level, in which questions of na-
tionality are raised. Nearly everyone seems to agree that people 
are entitled to give greater weight to the interests of their family 
members than to the interests of unrelated people located a long 
distance away. As we move out from the family, though, the 
consensus dissipates: families, surely, friends and neighbors, 
probably, but what about people who are merely co-residents of 
a territorially defined nation-state? To put the point provoca-
Reference). 
22. For the Supreme Court's most recent discussion, see Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. 0. 
1518 (1999). See also Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges Or 
Immunities Revival Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 
Harv. L. Rev. 110 (1999). 
23. I believe that interest in membership questions is a natural extension of the ef-
fects that identity politics had on constitutional law in the past decade. The issues of 
identity politics that shaped discussion of the regulation of hate speech and sexually ex-
plicit materials raised basic questions about claims for the universal applicability of con-
stitutional principles as they had conventionally been understood theretofore. Issues 
regarding membership raise similar questions. 
24. So, for example, the literature discusses whether fetuses, infants, those in persis-
tent vegetative states, or animals have rights that must be honored. 
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tively: Cosmopolitan intellectuals located on the east and west 
coasts of the United States have more in common with their 
peers in Europe and Japan than they do with many residents of 
Montana and Idaho. Why should a Constitution structured to 
some extent around natural rights make the simple fact of co-
residence in the United States more important than interests 
shared in common across national boundaries?25 
Cosmopolitanism raises another set of membership ques-
tions. Here the concern is with U.S. membership in the commu-
nity of nations. Some participants argued that the canon of con-
stitutional law should expand to include more materials about 
international law, understood broadly. Existing casebooks do 
deal with some aspects of the U.S. constitutional law of foreign 
relations, particularly with the relations between nation and 
state, and between president and Congress, in making foreign 
policy. The suggestion is, however, that students should be ex-
posed to materials dealing with the implications (if any) of inter-
national law for U.S. constitutional law. 
One can offer a fairly narrow pragmatic justification for at-
tention to international law: Ignoring it may muck up U.S. non-
constitutional policy. The best current examples are the compli-
cations introduced into the administration of capital punishment 
by the complex questions of how U.S. commitments to interna-
tional law affect state administration of the death penalty. Many 
nations will refuse to extradite fugitives who face the death pen-
alty (or who face long stays on death row before they are exe-
cuted), on the ground that U.S. practices are inconsistent with 
international human rights law.26 
Of course, there are larger questions. I have already men-
tioned that cosmopolitanism raises important issues in political 
theory. And, I believe, constitutional law in the next decade is 
likely to grapple with the implications of globalization for the 
domestic political regime, a regime that I have argued has consti-
tutional status.27 I might be wrong, but at least for the next cou-
ple of years there is reason to take up the implications of inter-
25. I have raised similar questions (ignored in the constitutional literature and per-
haps correctly so) about John Hart Ely's representation-reinforcement account of consti-
tutional interpretation. See Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of 
Constitutional Law 87 n.35 (Harvard U. Press, 1988). 
26. See generally Knight v. Florida, 120 S. a. 459, 462-64 (1999) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari). Cf. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). 
27. Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court: 1998 Term-Foreword: The New Constitu-
tional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 26 (1999). 
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national developments, and, therefore, the implications of inter-
national law, for U.S. constitutional law. 
Finally, participants were concerned about the audience for 
constitutional law courses. Some participants believed that they 
were primarily to be concerned about educating lawyers who 
must know the fundamentals of constitutional law if they are to 
be minimally competent professionals. Others believed that 
they were primarily to be concerned about educating people 
who, because of their professional credentials, were likely to be 
influential citizens in their communities. The disagreement, in 
short, is between educating professionals and educating respon-
sible citizens. 
The choice one makes affects a large number of pedagogical 
decisions, including decisions about the selection of materials. 
At this point it seems worth returning to a point I noted earlier: 
The canon is constructed in part by processes of inclusion and 
exclusion, and the latter incorporate questions about what the 
market will tolerate.28 So far I have discussed things that partici-
pants believe ought to included in any decent constitutional law 
course. But for every inclusion comes (almost) another exclu-
sion. 
The current canon of constitutional law excludes materials 
that were prominent in earlier canons. Most constitutional law 
coursebooks aimed at law students contain very little about con-
stitutional criminal procedure, a topic that was extruded a gen-
eration ago into specialized courses.29 There is today almost no 
discussion of intergovernmental tax immunities in any casebook, 
and precious little about limitations on the ability of states to tax 
interstate commerce. It is not clear, however, what large topic 
now included in standard constitutional law coursebooks could 
readily be omitted.30 
28. On the crudest, but not insignificant, level, the question is how heavy a book we 
can reasonably expect our students to lug around. 
29. Participants who teach undergraduates pointed out, however, that coursebooks 
aimed at those students must include some materials on constitutional criminal proce-
dure-an indication of one difference between the disciplines of law-school constitu-
tional law and arts-and-sciences constitutional law. 
30. My personal preference would be to eliminate detailed discussion of standing 
doctrine, which has become increasingly complex and is usually dealt with in courses on 
federal jurisdiction and administrative law. I would use the somewhat simpler political 
question doctrine as the vehicle to raise questions about the constitutional limits on judi-
cial power to interpret the Constitution. I do not expect this particular exclusion to hap-
pen soon, however. 
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Strikingly, the dormant commerce clause was the primary 
candidate for exclusion, though it was hardly a unanimous 
choice. People agreed that, in the abstract, dormant commerce 
clause materials added something to the course.31 It was not 
clear that those materials' marginal contribution was large 
enough, relative to what else might be inserted into the course. 
And yet the dormant commerce clause may be the most impor-
tant subject dealt with in the constitutional law course for prac-
ticing lawyers. To put it bluntly: A practicing lawyer has almost 
no need to know the difference between the two- or three-tier 
approach to equal protection law and the sliding-scale approach, 
but has a pressing need to know the difference between ERISA 
preemption and ordinary preemption. Lawyers practicing in 
large law firms will rarely confront a serious free expression or 
substantive due process question, but they will routinely con-
front substantial preemption arguments, and dormant commerce 
clause doctrine is almost essential to an understanding of pre-
emption doctrine. These lawyers, and lawyers practicing in 
other settings, may occasionally come across a serious takings 
problem, often in the context of a zoning dispute for a large 
commercial client. Even there, however, the constitutional claim 
is more likely to be a threat used to intimidate the other side in 
negotiations over the conditions under which a building permit 
will be granted, than a claim that might actually be vindicated in 
litigation. Constitutional law as represented in the canon plays a 
trivial role in the real world of legal practice.32 
In short, the question of whether, or how much, to teach 
about the dormant commerce clause raises important issues 
31. The dormant commerce clause cases illustrate a form of non-textual or penum-
bral reasoning and so provide a contrast with the commerce clause cases (and a preview 
of modem substantive due process cases). They provide a means of introducing some 
basic economics into the constitutional law course and sometimes some basic public 
choice ideas. And there are enough recent cases with varying facts to make the area a 
productive one to teach general analytic skills. 
32. Of course constitutional law creates the structure of government, with which 
lawyers must deal every day. But constitutional law courses rarely examine anything im-
portant that flows from that structure and affects daily legal practice. I suspect that most 
senior partners would snicker (or politely move on) if a recent law school graduate sug-
gested that some legislation they were dealing with for a client raised an interesting and 
possibly substantial Lopez question (even if, in some sense, it did). Of course the senior 
partner would ask the junior associate to look into the problem in more detail, but my 
guess is that the senior partner (or the client) would be unhappy if the research used up 
more than a handful of billable hours. The importance of Lopez will vary with the prac-
tice setting, and it certainly is more important to lawyers working for members of Con-
gress and for clients seeking to influence the drafting or enactment of federal statutes. 
But that is a relatively small segment of the legal community. 
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about the law school's role in educating professionals and re-
sponsible citizens. It is the locus where a real trade-off might ac-
tually take place. A survey of constitutional law teachers to see 
what they do with the dormant commerce clause would, I think, 
be quite revealing about our understanding of our function.33 
To conclude this introduction to the papers that follow: I 
have identified a number of themes that run through a large 
number of the papers. Perhaps, though, the most interesting 
ones will be the idiosyncratic ones-those that stray so far from 
the current canon of constitutional law that we would have a 
dramatically different canon if their suggestions were adopted, 
not merely one that shifted around the margins. I hope that the 
collection will provoke readers to think seriously about the syl-
labi they construct. I know that it had that effect on me. 
33. Again, the situation of teachers in law schools is different from that in under-
graduate programs. I think it quite difficult to make a substantial case for including ma-
terial on the dormant commerce clause in an undergraduate course, where, I would 
think, the primary concern must be for educating responsible citizens. But I do not teach 
undergraduates and may be mistaken. 
